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1957 '] RECENT DECISIONS 465· 
WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-CoNDITIONAL WILLS-Testator executed a holo-
graphic will immediately prior to departing on an intended journey abroad. 
The will, making a friend and creditor his sole beneficiary, provided, "This 
is my will if I should die on this my trip to India You are my sol heiress." 
Although the trip was postponed, it was never abandoned. Testator sub-
sequently repaid a substantial part of his debt to the beneficiary. Soon 
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thereafter, 1:estator died without having made the journey. His will was 
contested by his widow and brother. On remand to the surrogate's court 
from the court of appeals, held, the will is conditional and hence ineffec-
tive because the condition never occurred. In re Pascal's Estate, 152 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 185 (1956). 
Courts generally tend toward finding wills unconditional,1 but there is 
no well-defined basis for explaining their decisions.2 In determining 
whether a will is conditional or absolute, courts look to the testator's intent 
but if this is not clear, it is ascertained by rules of construction.3 The 
design of these rules is to declare wills absolute unless by their language 
and the circumstances they are clearly conditional. Pervading these devices 
is the policy that testacy rather than intestacy is preferred when a capable 
testator executes a will. Nevertheless, whether or not a particular will is 
contingent depends largely upon the factual situation.4 Presumptions and 
rules are so common in this area that the language of the will, when com-
bined with extrinsic evidence, may conceivably fit one rule establishing a 
condition and another negating one. As a result, opposite results have 
been reached on insignificant differences in language.5 In the principal 
case there is legitimate reason for holding the will conditional, although 
similar wills have been found absolute.6 The language of the will is con-
ditional, and equivalent to, or stronger than, that found in most other 
conditional wills.7 The decision, however, certainly raises some questions. 
Generally, parol evidence is inadmissible to show that a will absolute on 
its face is conditional. On the other hand, it is admissible to show that 
1 PAGE, WILLS, 3d ed., §96 (1941). 
2McMerriman v. Schiel, 108 Ohio St. 334 at 338, 140 N.E. 600 (1923). 
81 PAGE, WILLS, 3d ed., §92 (1941). The following rules of construction are commonly 
applied to conditional wills. (1) If the contingency is referred to in the will as the reason 
for a particular disposition, and the disposition and contingency are interdependent, the 
will is contingent, but the language must clearly show the intention to make a will opera-
tive only during a certain period or emergency. [Barber v. Barber, 368 Ill. 215 at 221, 222, 
13 N.E. (2d) 257 (1938)]; (2) If the contingency expressed refers to the occasion for mak-
ing the will at that time, or to a possible danger or threatened calamity, the will is not 
contingent. [Forquer's Estate, 216 Pa. 331 at 332, 333, 66 A. 92 (1907)]. (3) The fact that 
testator left a will implies intestacy was not desired. If there are two constructions pos-
sible, the court will prefer the one preventing intestacy. [Ferguson v. Ferguson, 121 Tex. 
119 at 122, 45 S.W. (2d) 1096 (1932)]. See also 1 PAGE, WILLS, 3d ed., §96 (1941). 
4 ATKINSON, WILLS, 2d ed., §83 (1953); Barber v. Barber, note 3 supra, at 222, 223. 
Courts consider change in circumstances of the testator or beneficiaries after the will is 
executed, or the seemingly unjust or unnatural dispositions of property, as well as the 
seeming wisdom and justice of dispositions. McMerriman v. Schiel, note 2 supra, at 340. 
5 See 11 A.L.R. 846 (1921); 79 A.L.R. 1168 (1932). The wills were held conditional 
in Bagnall v. Bagnall, 148 Tex. 423, 225 S.W. (2d) 401 (1949); Dougherty v. Dougherty, 4 
Mete. (61 Ky.) 25 (1862). The wills were held unconditional in National Bank of Com-
merce of Charleston v. Wehrle, 124 W.Va. 268, 20 S.E. (2d) 112 (1942); In re Marque's 
Will, 123 N.Y.S. (2d) 877 (1953). 
6 National Bank of Commerce of Charleston v. Wehrle, note 5 supra; French v. French, 
14 W.Va. 458 (1877); In re Moore's Estate, 322 Pa. 257, 2 A. (2d) 761 (1939). 
7 In most cases holding wills conditional the words, "if I never get back," referring to 
a certain journey, or "should anything happen to me," referring to a particular time or 
event, were used. Ferguson v. Ferguson, note 3 supra, at 126. 
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testator intended to make an unconditional will.8 In the principal case, 
the surrogate's court makes questionable use of extrinsic evidence. In ad-
mitting evidence of payment of the testator's debt to the beneficiary, the 
court apparently introduced a new condition to the will, viz., that it was to 
exist until the debt was paid. How much the court was influenced by 
payment of the debt is mere conjecture. Such evidence was not absolutely 
necessary to the result, yet a small change in the evidence might have swung 
the pendulum the other way.0 An alternative approach might have been 
used by the court. They could have recognized that the will is conditional, 
but yet found the condition to be subsequent10 rather than precedent. In 
other words, it was reasonable for the testator to assume that the will was 
in force from the time it was executed, and that it would become null and 
void upon his return home (condition subsequent), rather than that the 
will would be effective only from the time of departure until his return 
(condition precedent). In cases like the present one, the elementary and 
higher goal should not be obscured-that is, to follow the testator's inten-
tion when it is clear. In cases where the intention is unclear, the area of 
conflict can be narrowed and the principles favoring testacy best served by 
following rules of construction which will hold a will absolute unless the 
operative condition is clearly shown. 
Richard Rosenthal 
s Barber v. Barber, note 3 supra, at 222. 
9 An interesting point not mentioned in the decision was that testator left an estate 
worth more than $20,000 while the debt was .$7,500. This might indicate that the debt was 
insignificant, and he desired the beneficiary to have his estate for other reasons. The 
value of the estate was stated in the record of the Court of Appeals, 309 N.Y. 108, 127 
N.E. (2d) 835 (1955). There may have been reason for not having mentioned it in the 
surrogate•s decision. 
10 If the condition is held to be a condition subsequent, it would read, "this is my will 
until I return from India." 
